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Kay Knapp
I.

History and Development of the Guidelines

The Minnesota sentencing guidelines1 replaced a highly indeterminate sentencing system. Before the guidelines came into effect, the criminal code defined crimes and defined sentences that
were generally zero to twenty, zero to ten, or zero to five year
sentences-just broad ranges. The judges determined who they
would sentence to prison, but they generally pronounced a highly
symbolic sentence. The judge usually said, "I commit you to the
Commissioner of Corrections for a sentence of zero to twenty
years." It was the parole board who actually determined the sentence length with very little input from the judge.
In the 1970's, Minnesota legislators became disillusioned with
this indeterminate system. First, they observed the wide discretion that existed at the time and the disparity that resulted from
that system. Second, they believed the sentencing system was primarily based on rehabilitation and led to game playing by offenders, both in and outside of prison, trying to convince people that
they had become rehabilitated. Third, the legislators were concerned with investing so much sentencing authority in the hands
of an administrative parole board rather than in the hands of
judges and other publicly accountable officials.
1. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary (rev. ed. 1985), reprinted in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1986) [hereinafter cited as
Minn. Guidelines]. For a copy of the guidelines grid, see infra text accompanying

note 3.
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The issue was debated in the Legislature for three years with
the Senate supporting a determinate sentencing system where the
Legislature would set specific sentences and the judge would impose them. The House of Representatives, and particularly the
House Criminal Justice Committee, wanted to retain an indeterminate system and retain the authority of the parole board. After
two to three years of debate, the Legislature still had not resolved
the issue and essentially recognized a stalemate in the debate. At
that point in conference committee, the Legislature decided to establish a Sentencing Guidelines Commission and have the Commission try to resolve some of the issues that the Legislature had
been unable to resolve. The only thing on which the Legislature
instructed the Commission was to establish for each crime fixed
presumptive sentences that would be advisory to the district court.
The Legislature said that those sentences should be based on reasonable offense and offender characteristics. The directive was
quite vague. Finally, the Legislature instructed the Commission to
take into substantial consideration the current sentencing practices
and correctional resources including, but not limited to, prison
2
and jail capacities.
The Commission determined that the two most important
factors that should determine sentences would be the seriousness
of the current offense and the criminal history of the offender.
The Commission excluded offender characteristics that were not
related to the criminal record. It excluded factors such as employment, family situation, and living situation from consideration in
the guidelines.
The sentencing guidelines grid is provided below. I will
briefly explain how it works.
2. Minn. Stat. § 244.09 (1984).
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MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Sentencing Guidelines Grid3
CRIMINAL HISTORY SCORE

SEVERITY LEVELS OF
CONVICTION OFFENSE
Unauthorized Use of
Motor Vehicle
Possessionof Marijuana

CriminalSexual Conduct

III

CriminalSexual Conduct
1st Degree
Assault 1st Degree
Murder, 3rd Degree
Murder,2nd Degree
(felony murder)
Murder 2nd Degree
(with intent)

6 or more

2&22

..
$5

17

i

S:.."
*.......

...
.

V
.. ..
. ....

30
2-31

19

25

21-23

2426

25
24-26

32
30-34

41
37-45

38
36-40

46
43-49

54
50-58
05

3

5-42-46

22

18-20

44

:

VI::

2nd Degree (a) & (b)
Aggravated Robbery

5

19
18-20

Nonresidential Burglary.:
Theft Crimes (over $2500)
Residential Burglary
Simple Robbery

4

I i

Theft Related Crimes
($250425001
Aggravated Forgery
($25000)
Theft Crimes ($250-$2500)

3

2

1

0

54

65

50-58

60.70

VII

24
23-25

32
30-34

41
38-44

49
45-53

65
60-70

81
75-87

97
90-104

VIII

43
41-45

54
50-58

65
60-70

76
71-81

95
89-101

113
106-120

132
124-140

IX

105
102-108

119
116-122

127
124-130

149
143-155

176
168-184

205
195-215

230
218-242

X

120
116-124

140
133-147

162
153-171

203
192-214

243
231-255

284
270-298

324
309-339

1st Degree Murder is excluded from the guidelines by law and continues to have a mandatory life sentence.

l

At the discretion of the judge, up to a year in jail and/or other non-jail sanctions can be imposed as
conditions of probation.

IPresumptive

commitment to state imprisonment.

*one year and one day

The vertical dimension is the seriousness of the current offense. These are severity levels. A severity level of one represents
the least serious among offenses, such as unauthorized use of motor vehicle or possession of a relatively small amount of marijuana,
down to severity level ten, which is murder, homicides, and crimes
of that seriousness. The Commission ranked all of these offenses
according to how serious they are and then collapsed them into ten
severity levels. The horizontal dimension represents the criminal
history score of the offender; the score is based upon four prior
relevant criminal factors.
The Commission developed a dispositional line, or an "in and
out line," that separates those who presumptively would go to the
state prison. Any offender who falls into a cell below the dispositional line is given a presumptive prison sentence. Above the dispositional line, the presumption is that the person will not go to
3. Minn. Guidelines, supra note 1, § IV.
table, see infra appendix, at 72.

For the offense severity reference
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state prison. Under Minnesota law, however, offenders who do not
go to state prison but are convicted of a felony and placed on probation can serve up to a year in the local jail at the discretion of
the judge as a condition of that probation.
Placement above the line, therefore, does not mean non-incarceration. It just means non-imprisonment and a limit of one
year that can be spent at the local jail. The numbers in the cells
located below the dispositional line are months of imprisonment.
For example, with a severity level of seven and a zero criminal history score (under which aggravated robbery is the most common
offense), the presumptive sentence is twenty-four months in
prison.
There is a small range underneath that, twenty-three to
twenty-five months, within which the judge can sentence without
departing from the presumptive sentence. The amount of the sentence that is actually served in prison in Minnesota is reduced by
good behavior credit. One day of good time can be earned for
every two days of good behavior.4 Essentially we would anticipate
that two-thirds of the sentence would be served in prison with the
last third being spent on supervised release before the sentence actually expired.
When the Commission developed this system, it changed past
practices considerably. The policy was developed so that many
more person offenders, or offenses against persons, and fewer
property offenders were recommended for state imprisonment. To
a large extent the Commission adopted retribution or just deserts
as a purpose of sentencing, basing the sentence on the culpability
of the offender in committing the offense. Other kinds of sentencing goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation now
must be pursued within the constraint of just deserts. For example, in Minnesota's system you cannot increase the sentence length
because you think the offender might commit another offense
sometime in the future. That would be considered inappropriate
and would probably not be allowed by the Supreme Court.
Rather, the primary principle is retributive with other sentencing
goals pursued within that constraint.
Speaking of the appellate courts, the sentencing guidelines
brought appellate review of sentencing, which is fairly new in Minnesota as it is in many states. Prior to the sentencing guidelines,
the only basis on which a sentence could be appealed was the legality of the sentence. Given the highly discretionary sentencing
4. Minn. Stat. § 244.04 (1984).
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laws that existed, it was almost impossible to give an illegal sentence. Therefore, virtually no sentencing case law existed.
Under the guidelines, sentences can be appealed, not on the
basis of the legality of the sentence, but on the basis of the appropriateness of the sentence. Either the defense or prosecution can
appeal a sentence. 5 As a practical matter, most of the appeals are
by the defense, as is true in many state systems. In many cases,
sentences are to some extent agreed upon by the defense and the
prosecution. Not all of them are, but for a majority there is some
level of understanding that the sentence imposed is appropriate.
Prosecutors, for example, often agree that a mitigated sentence is
appropriate, and therefore will not appeal those cases. The defense most often appeals aggravated sentences. Appeals of incarceration time have created a new area of case law in Minnesota.
We now have over 300 opinions handed down by the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the intermediate appellate court on the issue
of sentencing. Recently these appellate decisions have been annotated so the case law in particular sentencing areas is accessible.
Essentially, the system transferred discretion exercised by
the parole board to judges and prosecutors, with general sentencing policy articulated by the Commission. The Commission states
policy for the Legislature in order to serve as a buffer for the Legislature in this policy area which generates a lot of interest and
emotion. The Commission's development of specific policies tends
to offer the Legislature some protection from some of the more
extreme public views on sentencing.
I.

Impact of the Sentencing Guidelines

The goals of the guidelines were to increase uniformity in
sentencing, to increase proportionality in sentencing, and to have
an implementable policy which means that we would live within
the correctional resources that the Legislature made available. After the guidelines went into effect, the sentences became more uniform. Offenders with a similar severity of offense and criminal
history received similar sentences more frequently than before the
guidelines went into effect. In terms of proportionality, more person offenders and fewer property offenders are going to prison.
Initially we had a large increase in the number of serious person
offenders being sentenced to prison. There has been some slippage, however, in the proportion of property offenders and person
offenders going to prison. Now more property offenders are going
5. Minn. Stat. § 244.11 (1984).
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to prison than when the guidelines first went into effect. One reason is that there is some evidence in a small number of cases that
prosecutors have started to file and obtain more convictions for
property crimes, which may push certain offenders across the dispositional line. Therefore the criminal history scores are getting
higher. Prosecutors do not dismiss as many cases. That means
more property offenders are going to prison, presumptively.
Another group of offenders going to prison that we had not
anticipated are offenders who request to go to prison. Property offenders, in particular, may request this disposition. As I mentioned, the judge, with the stayed sentence or non-imprisonment
sentence, does have the option of giving the offender up to a year
in jail. Along with that option there can be a long period of probation and many other conditions such as treatment or community
service or restitution. All of the sanctions can add up to be quite
onerous. Some offenders just preferred to go to prison with a relatively short sentence and do their time. The Minnesota Supreme
Court has consistently upheld the defendants' requests for going to
prison. This also contributes to the increase in property offenders
going to prison.
As a result of the guidelines, we have not experienced delays
in case processing. The same amount of time passes between initial appearance and sentencing as occurred before the guidelines.
The rate of trials in the state has remained about the same,
although in some counties trials have increased and in others they
have decreased. I expect the variation among counties has more to
do with legal processing issues than with the guidelines.
The prison population has remained within capacity. We added a 400-bed facility to our capacity in 1982 so we do have some
extra space that we did not have when the guidelines were developed. We rent out that extra space to Wisconsin and to the federal
government. As a result, we have generated many millions of dollars of revenue. The income is an incentive for keeping our prison
population down.
In terms of the future of the guidelines, the Commission has
the authority to modify the guidelines. It has modified the guidelines seven times. The Commission modifies the guidelines annually to incorporate new crimes that the Legislature creates, to
respond to the Legislature, as well as to clarify constantly the language as unique cases come up that the guidelines do not adequately cover. In the modifications, the Commission generally has
increased, rather than decreased sentences. On one occasion in
1983, however, we did decrease some sentences. I expect any ma-
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jor changes that occur to the guidelines over the next few years
will be in the area of non-imprisonment sanctions. In particular, a
likely area will be establishing guidelines to deal with local jail
sanctions. We have a nonproportionality problem on that level
with some of the local sanctions being more severe than the prison
sanction. In the future, there will be increasing interest in developing some guidelines to structure that discretion as well as the
prison time.
Tom Johnson
I am going to start off with some general comments from the
prosecutor's perspective about sentencing guidelines and then turn
to some specific issues. As a prosecutor and elected official within
the prosecutor's office, I have the responsibility for representing
the community, the public.
If you were to ask the public whether or not they see the
courts' criminal justice system as doing justice, they probably
would focus on the sentencing aspect more than anything else.
The public occasionally becomes upset about cases being thrown
out on technicalities. For the most part, however, they focus on
the sentence and on whether it seems fair and just. In significant
trials, the sentence is most often reported by both the printed and
visual media. Therefore, the public is very much attuned to awaiting the sentence to determine whether or not justice has been
achieved in any particular case.
To my knowledge, there has not been a Minnesota public
opinion survey done on sentencing guidelines. My sense is that the
public would not like the sentencing guidelines. If you were to
show the chart and say-"Do you think it's fair that someone who
commits an armed robbery serves twenty-four months minus onethird off for good time?"-very few people on the street corner
would say, "Yeah, that sounds about right." They would say, "Five
years. Ten years." Most likely the public would be very critical of
some of the sentences set by the guidelines.
Surprisingly, however, the sentencing guidelines in general
have gained fairly widespread acceptance within Minnesota. There
are several reasons for the guidelines' acceptance. One reason is
that those public officials who have been in the best position to
launch an attack against the guidelines have demonstrated only a
minimal amount of demagoguery. There have been periods, however, when the guidelines provoked political controversy. Some
candidates campaigning for state offices in the 1982 and 1984 elections made the guidelines an issue against incumbents. These can-
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didates questioned why certain legislators, sitting on the
appropriate committees or within the general body, had not asked
the Legislature to review the guidelines set by the Commission.
Those candidates lost and since then the issue has really quieted
down. To a certain extent the controversy went beyond the
bounds of what the public in Minnesota, at least, was willing to
consider rational and well-reasoned.
Another reason Minnesota citizens accept the guidelines is
because they are an important breakthrough in sentencing. The
guidelines represent truth-in-sentencing. As Ms. Knapp discussed,
for the first time you truly know how long persons are going to
serve in prison, or whether they are even going to prison, in advance of the crime being committed. That is a very significant
breakthrough. Whether or not you agree with the specific number
of months for which a person is incarcerated, you know that is
how long the sentence is going to be. The sentence is not zero-toten years, and then leaving the parole boards to make the decision
regarding release. The certainty of sentences has gained support
from the public.
There is also an understanding that sentencing is more consistent. With more consistency, at least in the aggregate, comes
greater fairness. Whether or not you like the guidelines, the public does like to sense that people are going to be treated similarly.
I think these are some reasons why the guidelines have gained
acceptance.
I do not know, however, how the sentencing guidelines would
fare if you polled the eighty-seven county attorneys in Minnesota.
My guess is that a majority of county attorneys would say, "Yeah,
they're okay." The attorneys have individual gripes about particular sentences and some of the disparities that still exist. For example, the difference between the period of incarceration for murder
one and for murder two is a wide gap. However, we all know that
the very slimmest of evidence may distinguish between whether
murder was simply intentional but not premeditated or intentional
and premeditated, which is the stereotypical murder one. Yet
there is a wide sentencing difference between those two offenses.
In general though, the certainty and consistency of sentences are
the reasons for acceptance, even among prosecutors, of a system
that on its face would seem to cry out for overturn if focusing simply on the length of imprisonment that it provides for any particular offense.
Now let me turn to more specific issues: the effect of the sentencing guidelines on the charging of crimes, the negotiation of
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pleas, and the appealing of sentences. Within Hennepin County
the effect of the sentencing guidelines on the charging decision has
been very minimal. We are not charging anyone that we did not
charge before. That I can say very definitely. We are not adding
any more additional counts than we did before; if we are, it is a
rare occurrence. The policy within our office, and I was elected in
1978 so I predated the guidelines by a couple of years, has been
that we are responsible chargers. You will not see any twenty-five
to 100-count complaints coming out of our office.
We look for a course of conduct. We then choose those
crimes that best describe the course of conduct that the person engaged in and charge a representative number of those counts. If
someone has been on a bad check spree or a burglary spree, three,
six, or eight counts are possible. Very seldom do we ever get in
double figures. We have not, although Mr. Falvey may disagree,
taken advantage of the guidelines in the sense of having changed
our charging practices to bring people routinely as close to that
black line as we can as a part of the charging decision.
Now let me move on to negotiating pleas. In that area the
change has been more significant. First, we use some discretion as
to whether or not we think we have charged a "bad actor." We are
talking for the most part now about cases that are above the line.
That means it is not a prison sentence but rather a case where the
judge can sentence the person up to a year in the county facility
and impose a probationary period and other conditions. If we do
have bad ones charged, even though we know we cannot put these
people in prison, we are inclined to try to hold tight on our negotiation-to negotiate to move them as close to the imprisonment line
as possible. If we do that, then in the event they commit another
offense, we have a better crack at putting them into prison. Therefore we are well aware of what is going on when it comes time to
negotiate and what the effect of the guidelines may be. As Ms.
Knapp has commented, this is reflected in that more property offenders are going to prison than was expected when the guidelines
were adopted. This is the result of prosecutors holding tighter on
people that they see as real recidivists. Prosecutors want to move
those people to a place on the guidelines chart where, the next
time around, they will see some prison time. The guidelines represent an articulated state policy on sentencing. Thus, there is nothing wrong with using the policy to its fullest.
When the guidelines were enacted, the state, for the first
time, was given the right to appeal a sentence. So far, the Hennepin County Attorney's Office has taken only a few appeals. Prose-
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cutors are hesitant to appeal sentencing decisions for practical
reasons. To appeal a judge's decision is to appeal the decision of a
judge you will be back before the next day. The Hennepin County
Attorney's Office appeals the trial court's decision only when the
best interests of justice dictate an appeal.
If we were to start all over again, we should reverse this
chart so that those who go to prison, the more serious offenders,
would be represented on the chart above the line rather than below the line. If legislatures are entertaining sentencing guidelines
in your state, a "big" substantive suggestion would be to reverse
this chart. Also, I would suggest a guidelines system that does not
make a distinction between probation offenses and prison
sentences. We do make such a distinction, and unfortunately, the
result is that every time someone is not going to be sentenced to
prison, they are going to be put on probation. To the public, of
course, that means the offenders are out on the street. Well, they
may actually serve up to one year in local jails or may be on probation with some heavy conditions. Despite these possible sanctions
for those in the probationary part of the grid, the line distinguishing probation and prison is truly a bright line in Minnesota, and
there is no way to get around that fact.
Let me close by explaining what I see as the effects of the
guidelines. In our county there was an increase in the percentage
of cases going to trial. It increased by about two percent following
enactment of the guidelines. While I would not say the increase
was solely the result of the guidelines being implemented, there is
no doubt they were a significant factor. The argument was made
that the number of trials was going to be significantly increased
because defendants knew what their sentence was going to be and
therefore had no reason to negotiate. Well, that obviously did not
turn out to be true since that would have resulted in a greater
increase.
In Hennepin County, a relatively large urban county, fewer
property offenders are going to prison than formerly went to
prison. As Ms. Knapp indicated, this trend exists statewide. The
opposite is true for crimes of violence. We are sending more people who commit crimes of violence to prison for longer periods of
time. It is difficult to get up on a soapbox and say that doesn't
make sense if another goal is to restrict the available space within
the state prisons-a policy decision made by the Minnesota
Legislature.
One of the problems, and I will close with this, is trying to
keep up with the decisions of our appellate courts as to the sen-
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tencing guidelines and how they should be implemented. When
you look at their decisions, it is very difficult to generalize the
courts' reasoning. Various publications try to characterize the different circumstances and identify the factors that lead to a departure. It is not, however, always easy to tell. For example, in some
cases it may not be clear at all whether the court explicitly or implicitly upheld a specific factor as a basis for departure. One of my
favorite publications on the topic was prepared by an attorney in
our office. The title illustrates the problem I have been referring
to. It is entitled Compendium of Specific Factual Bases Which
Have Been Used to Support the Various Possible Sentencing Outcomes under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, or The Joy of
Sentencing.
William E. Falvey
Let me start by saying what a joy it is for a small town lawyer like myself to cross the great river to the land of tall buildings,
glittering hotels, and apparently enlightened prosecution.
I am going to talk about the defense perspective of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines. I am also a member of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission so there is a certain bias
that I have, a bias of authorship if you will. I take credit for all the
good things about the guidelines, and I blame the other nine members of the Commission for all those things that are not good about
the guidelines.
In order to understand the defense perspective of sentencing
guidelines, I have to take you back a little in history-back to the
good old days when jails were jails and not detention centers,
when we had no discovery, and trials were by ambush. For me
that is the mid-1960's, when I started practicing law.
Sentences, as Ms. Knapp and Mr. Johnson pointed out, historically were indeterminate. We had the nickel offense, the dime
offense, and the quarter offense. The sentences were all zero to
the statutory maximum. Now plea bargaining was kind of goofy at
that time. You would visit a client and the dialogue might go
something like this. "Charlie, remember me? I am your public defender. We met about ninety days ago for two minutes when you
were arraigned. Well, tomorrow is your trial, but I don't think we
are going to have that trial, Charlie, because I had lunch with the
prosecutor yesterday, and I had dinner with the judge. And because it's Friday and the National Association of Women Judges
are meeting in Minneapolis and because I like you, we got that
sentence cut in half. Now you know you are charged with a
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twenty year burglary, but because of my skill, that's going to be reduced to ten years, Charlie. We got that baby cut in half."
Well, to the uninitiated, that looks like a good deal. To those
folks who have been to prison before, they know that is absolute
nonsense. Whether clients went on a limitation of ten years or the
full twenty years, they were going to be doing about the same
amount of time. In the 1960's and early 1970's, there was no really
good accounting of how much time people spent in prison, but indeed the perception was that when offenders went to prison, if
they found Jesus and learned the twelve steps of A.A., they would
be out in ninety days.
On the other hand, if some poor klutzes did not understand
and did not want to cure themselves of bad habits, they might end
up serving their full sentences. In effect, what I am trying to tell
you is that plea bargaining was very illusory in those days. The
politicians finally got fed up with the indeterminate system. I
have the sense that back in the 1970's when the legislators were
talking about determinate sentences, they were a little mad at the
parole board because almost everybody had the same perception I
just gave you.
Because of these factors the parole board heard footsteps, and
those footsteps were those of legislators. In 1976 the Legislature
created what were called "Release Guidelines," and it was called
by practitioners the "Matrix System." This was kind of a goofy
thing which I do not quite understand to this day. Fortunately, the
"Release Guidelines" had a life of only four years. Apparently it
was what a social scientist would call a "Predicted Risk of Failure
Model." They were guidelines that did not determine whether offenders were going to prison but rather when they got there how
long they were going to stay based on their background. So when
you had the plea bargain session with the client, you had to go up
to him and say something like this: "Well, Charlie, I have got bad
news and I have got good news. The bad news is I don't know
whether you are going to go to prison or not. The good news is if
you do go, it is only going to be sixty-three months you will have
to serve because you are in that category where there is a predicted risk of failure of 'X' percent."
When they got to prison these people were all asked certain
questions such as: Were you nineteen or younger at the age of offense? Did you have three or more convictions? Any probation violations? From the number of yes answers the client would be
assigned a risk level which was then translated into a group failure
rate. Well, in my mind, that turned out to be preemptive sentenc-
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ing. It was like telling somebody, "since it is predicted that you
are going to fail again, fella, we are going to punish you for that
failure right now." How people can predict a failure rate for an individual, as opposed to a group, I do not know. In any event, to me
that was kind of like predicting pregnancy or going ahead and
playing a form of Russian Roulette with sentences.
Overall, I found something ethically perverse that people
would predict this is going to happen to a group and then take the
individuals and sentence them that way. In spite of its shortcomings, it did provide the defense attorney with the ability to tell a
client, "If you do go to prison, here is the amount of time you are
going to spend there-maybe." Because of the little rules that the
corrections board developed up there, predicting sentences was not
all that accurate. The corrections board said they had a departure
or deviation rate of twenty percent. Others, more informed than I,
however, would say the rate of deviation or departure was far
greater. In any event, it was an improvement because at least you
could tell a client, "If you go, this is about how much time you are
going to spend." That approach was a lot more honest than the old
illusory bargain of not telling clients anything or telling them that
they were really getting a bargain which did not amount to
anything.
Then came 1980 and skies opened and enlightenment shown
down on everybody. The state of Minnesota adopted the sentencing guidelines that have been outlined by Ms. Knapp.
Before the ink was dry, as you can imagine, all the clients in
the Ramsey County Adult Detention Center had a copy of the
guideline grid. They had them before I could get them out to the
lawyers that work in my office. They learned quickly.
Finally we could deal honestly with a client. We could tell
the client, "Okay, Charlie. Here you are. Based on your criminal
history and based on the severity of the offense, primarily the severity of the offense, this is what's going to happen to you. You
are going to be on probation but you might spend up to a year in
the workhouse," or, "You are going to prison for twenty-four
months."
As Mr. Johnson stated, a lot of people thought the sentencing
guidelines would create all sorts of trials when people found out
that this was going to happen to them with or without a trial. Everybody would go to trial. Not so! Young criminal defendants, including indigent criminal defendants, like to have some certainty
in their lives. So the big bugaboo of more trials never really mate-
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rialized. Therefore the system is good because, to a major extent,
we can tell defendants what is going to happen with their case.
Do the sentencing guidelines solve all the problems of felony
sentencing in Minnesota? I do not think they really do. The first
thing to understand is that the below-the-line category (defendants
who go to prison) is twenty percent of the cases, whereas the
above-the-line category (defendants who receive probationary
sentences) is eighty percent of the cases. A judge, of course, as a
condition of probation can send somebody to the workhouse or
county jail for up to one year. Here we begin playing with disparity again. Judge A may decide, "You little son of a gun, you stole a
car, and I am going to make you do six months in the workhouse."
Judge B, however, might say, "Aw, he is a good kid. I know he is
from a good family. I am going to give him straight probation." So
the potential for disparity exists, and actual disparity does go on.
The differences do not only exist from district to district but
also within a district where more than one judge sentences. When
people who are similarly situated are treated differently, I think
that is unjust. There are always going to be exceptions. We do not
want guidelines so rigid that there is no flexibility for justice to be
done. By and large, however, people of similar circumstances
ought to be treated alike. We are doing that with twenty percent
of our cases but not with the other eighty percent. To me, this is a
problem the guidelines should address.
The other problem with the guidelines is plain and simple:
prosecutorial manipulation. This does happen. In my mind this
accounts for an inordinate number of people going to prison on
property offenses. The way this works, a prosecutor can charge
some defenseless AFDC mother. Suppose she has run out of
money at the end of the month. She goes and cashes a bad check
at Target, one of our discount stores, and one at K-Mart. She
writes another bad check at Sears, and maybe she comes to the
Amfac Hotel and writes another check. On the first charge she
has a zero criminal history score. As you go on with the other
charges, however, she gets a criminal history point for the first
one, and it goes up a point for each bad check. An unscrupulous
prosecutor can push somebody to the very end and off the end of
the guidelines grid. The judge is not able to be the equalizer on
the prosecution's charging discretion. Before the guidelines, if a
prosecutor was trying to make a big name by prosecuting the
AFDC mother, the judge could kind of equalize things with the
sentence, but judges cannot do that under the guidelines. It is
what we call the "Hernandez problem," coming from the name of
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a case, State v. Hernandez.6
Another way prosecutors can manipulate the guidelines is to
take a case, charge aggravated robbery, an offense that falls below
the dispositional line, and simple robbery, an offense above the dispositional line. Both are weak charges but result in bludgeoning a
plea of guilty on the basis you do not want that poor client going to
prison. Even though your above-the-line case is weak also, you are
going to want to avoid the possibility of that person going to
prison.
We Americans have some real crazy ideas on proportionality-that is, whether or not the time fits the crime. I would like to
mention by way of example one issue that is now before the Commission. The State Attorney General has come to the Guidelines
Commission and said, "We would like you to determine the severity level for bid rigging." Bid rigging occurs when contractors in
collusion with one another decide they are going to skim a little
from the public coffers. The State Attorney General said to the
members of the Commission that he would like to see this crime
rated at a severity level of five purportedly to teach the contractors a lesson. For the first time in my experience before the Commission, which goes back to 1978, we see at our meetings corporate
lawyers in the three-piece suits. You know those are the guys who
represent the contractors. They said to members of the Commission, "Let's keep this down at severity level three if you are going
to rank it at all." The corporate lawyers believe the contractor, a
middle class person, should not be going to prison. What the lawyer wants for the contractor is maybe a weekend in the county jail
and an essay on business ethics. You know, "boys will be boys."
In these bid-rigging cases we are talking about public loss in
thousands of dollars, according to the attorney general. Well, I can
compare one of my poor indigent clients who might get in a little
trouble here. You know, a client who might be on probation. He
runs out of money while he is on probation and rips off that Target store for $251, rips off the Amfac Hotel of another television,
and finds another place where he gets one of those squawk boxes
that kids carry on their shoulder. Total $750 worth of goods. All
of a sudden that client is doing nineteen months in prison.
For another example, in our state the Legislature says if the
AFDC mother goes out and cashes a bad check, she can receive up
to ten years in prison. Yet she can give the money to her boyfriend. He can get roaring drunk, go out in his car and kill somebody, and still the most that can happen to him is five years in
6. 311 N.W.2d 478 (Minn. 1981).
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prison. This example shows that we still have some system
problems here.
What would I do to change the system if I could get the proxy
of these other nine members? The first thing I would do is move
the dispositional line so that persons convicted of crimes in severity levels one, two, and three could not be sentenced to prison, regardless of their criminal history score. In looking at the offenses
that are within those severity levels, none of them in my mind is
egregious enough to warrant a prison sentence.
After moving the dispositional line as described, I would go
back and start creating jail guidelines so people similarly situated
in these above-the-line cases would be treated fairly or relatively
the same. The whole purpose of sentencing guidelines in my mind
is to eliminate disparity and to create some uniformity so all people-all Americans-are treated alike. I do not, however, have
those nine proxies at this point. So let me close by saying that all
of us who practice law know that the judges always have the last
word in things. With that I will turn it over to Judge
Tomljanovich.
The Honorable Esther Tomljanovich
I am sure that the audience will agree it is appropriate that
judges have the last word. That is how the world should be run.
The first question judges ask about the sentencing guidelines
is whether or not guidelines will affect their discretion. Sure they
will. Absolutely. The standards set that out. Guidelines supporters say they want to establish rational and consistent sentences
which reduce disparity in sentencing. Guidelines that require consistency in sentencing will necessarily interfere with your discretion. The next question is, how much will it interfere? Will it
really affect my personal philosophy of sentencing and what I
want to accomplish as a trial judge? The answer is not much.
First of all, as Mr. Falvey pointed out, it only affects substantially
twenty percent of the people we see. The more substantial question is whether or not these people will or will not go to prison.
At least eighty percent of them will not go to prison. The guidelines do not set forth the conditions of probation.
Mr. Falvey calls that disparity. I call that discretion. We can
still look at the person and prescribe up to a year in the county
jail. I don't do that very often and neither do many other judges.
We can prescribe long-term treatment. We can prescribe living situations. There are a lot of things that we can do to control offenders while they are on probation. The guidelines do not affect that
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control. The guidelines suggest that we look to retribution, rehabilitation, public protection, deterrence, public condemnation of
the criminal conduct, and restitution. These are the goals of the
criminal justice system that are in the back of my mind whenever
I decide sentences. It has always been my view that for most
things a good sharp crack of jail time is probably the most effective
way to accomplish all of these goals except restitution. I will often
prescribe jail time, and the guidelines do not interfere with that
decision.
When the guidelines were first adopted, the judges, I think,
looked at them and hypothesized all sorts of horror stories. We
said, What if ...

? We feared situations where the sentences re-

quired by the guidelines would not fit the crime. The guidelines,
however, specify that in certain circumstances it is appropriate to
deviate from the guidelines. The guidelines set forth factors for
mitigation as well as factors for aggravation. 7 They also set forth
7. The guidelines provide a nonexclusive list of factors to use when departing
from the presumptive sentence. Mitigating factors which may be used as reasons
for departure include the following:
(1) The victim was an aggressor in the incident.
(2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or participated under circumstances of coercion or duress.
(3) The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked
substantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed. The voluntary use of intoxicants (drugs or alcohol) does not
fall within the purview of this factor.
(4) Other substantial grounds exist which tend to excuse or mitigate
the offender's culpability, although not amounting to a defense.
Minn. Guidelines, supra note 1, § II.D.2a. Aggravating factors include the
following(1) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or
reduced physical or mental capacity, which was known or should
have been known to the offender.
(2) The victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual offender should be held responsible.
(3) The current conviction is for an offense in which the victim was
injured and there is a prior felony conviction for an offense in
which the victim was injured.
(4) The offense was a major economic offense, identified as an illegal
act or series of illegal acts committed by other than physical
means and by concealment or guile to obtain money or property,
to avoid payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or professional advantage. The presence of two or more of
the circumstances listed below are aggravating factors with respect to the offense:
(a) the offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per victim;
(b) the offense involved an attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than the usual offense
or substantially greater than the minimum loss specified in the statutes;
(c) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication
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the factors we should not use: race, sex, employment factors, and
social factors.8 Some of the mitigating factors are that the victim
was the aggressor, the offender played a passive or a minor role in
the crime or committed the crime under coercion or duress.
Another mitigating factor is physical or mental capacity. We
or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of
time;
(d) the defendant used his or her position or status to
facilitate the commission of the offense, including
positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships; or
(e) the defendant has been involved in other conduct
similar to the current offense as evidenced by the
findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or
the imposition of professional sanctions.
(5) The offense was a major controlled substance offense, identified
as an offense or series of offenses related to trafficking in controlled substances under circumstances more onerous than the
usual offense. The presence of two or more of the circumstances
listed below are aggravating factors with respect to the offense:
(a) the offense involved at least three separate transactions wherein controlled substances were sold, transferred, or possessed with intent to do so; or
(b) the offense involved an attempted or actual sale or
transfer of controlled substances in quantities substantially larger than for personal use; or
(c) the offense involved the manufacture of controlled
substances for use by other parties; or
(d) the offender knowingly possessed a firearm during
the commission of the offense; or
(e) the circumstances of the offense reveal the offender
to have occupied a high position in the drug distribution hierarchy; or
(f) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication
or planning or occurred over a lengthy period of time
or involved a broad geographic area of disbursement;
or
(g) the offender used his or her position or status to facilitate the commission of the offense, including positions of trust, confidence or fiduciary relationships
(e.g., pharmacist, physician or other medical
professional).
Id. § II.D.2b.
8. Employment factors that should not be used as reasons for departing from
the guidelines include:
(1) occupation or impact of sentence on profession or occupation;
(2) employment history;
(3) employment at time of offense;
(4) employment at time of sentencing.
Id. § II.D.lc. Social factors include the following:
(1) educational attainment;
(2) living arrangements at time of offense or sentencing;
(3) length of residence;
(4) marital status.
Id. § II.D.ld.
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see that most often with the sex offender, for example, the offender who has sexual contact with his twelve-year-old cousin.
The offender may be slightly retarded. Diminished mental capacity is not enough to amount to a defense, but it is a sufficient reason to prescribe a mitigated sentence. We can provide some
positive treatment so that the offender is taught social skills,
among other things. Alternatively, we can provide some jail to indicate such conduct is not appropriate in our society.
The guidelines also include a catch-all provision that permits
a mitigated sentence when other substantial grounds exist which
tend to excuse or mitigate the offender's culpability. You can put
most everything you want in there.
One of the aggravating factors is that the victim was particularly vulnerable. I had a woman just several weeks ago who killed
her seventeen-month-old baby. The defendant had some mental
problems that did not amount to an insanity defense. She pled
guilty to a second degree murder charge. I gave her one and a half
times the presumptive sentence, fifteen years, which seemed like
an appropriate sentence considering the vulnerability of that seventeen-month-old child.
Another ground to deviate is when the victim was treated
with particular cruelty. We see such treatment in a lot of rape
cases or in other major offenses. A third ground to deviate is
when the crime is a major economic offense. In those cases you
have to find that the amount of the theft was in a substantially
greater amount than the statutory minimum. You must also find
many victims or a high degree of sophistication.
We can also deviate in a major controlled substance offense.
Selling a couple of joints of marijuana is a lot different than selling
three bales of marijuana. I see the judge from Miami is smiling. I
am sure you are thinking about truckloads and airplane loads. In
Minnesota we don't think in those terms.
When looking at the guidelines grid, it appears that someone
can commit six car thefts and not go to prison. At first people
threw up their hands and were shocked by that scenario. That really is not true. If someone has committed the six car thefts, no
doubt the thefts occurred in a short period of time. The thief is
still on probation for that first one and maybe the second one and
maybe the third one.
Judges have a provision in their probationary sentence that
requires the offender to remain law-abiding and on good behavior.
When an offender commits the fourth, fifth, and sixth offense, he
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is not law-abiding. He comes back into my court, and I send him
to prison, if I choose, on a probation revocation.
There are some problems with the guidelines. Some of the
definitions are too imprecise to fit a crime. I had a young man convicted of an armed robbery in which there was no weapon except
the car. The crime fit the definition of armed robbery because
there was an injury. The defendant was sitting in a parking lot at
a shopping center. A woman came out, he drove by and grabbed
her purse. She hung on, and her knees were scraped. It was really
a purse snatching from a car. He was charged and convicted of
armed robbery. I deviated on his sentence. The case was appealed
and upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court. I gave him a year in
the county jail because what he did was not nice, but I don't think
the definition of armed robbery quite fit his actions.
I believe some of the crimes should be reclassified. For example, residential burglaries are not property crimes, but they are
classified that way. A residential burglary is a person crime, and I
think it should be treated with a more severe sentence. Another
example is the classification, or severity level, for the sale of drugs.
Sentences are light for the sale of marijuana and the sale of cocaine in view of the damage they do to the victims.
Another flaw under our guidelines is that a greater sentence
cannot be plea bargained. In one case a defendant agreed to plead
to second degree criminal sexual conduct with a sentence in excess
of the guideline. I accepted the plea because the victims did not
want to testify. I gave him an aggravated sentence but I didn't set
out any aggravating factors. I said it was a plea-bargained sentence. It was reversed by the state court of appeals. It seems to
me that if offenders can give up their constitutional right to a trial
and can give up their constitutional right to remain silent, they
should be able to give up a statutory right to be sentenced under
the guidelines. The court of appeals, however, did not agree with
this analysis, which struck me as silly.
The short length of the supervised release time under our
guidelines is another problem. If I sentence an offender to fifteen
years, she will usually serve ten, and then she is on supervised release for five years. Or when I sentence thirty-six months, the offender serves twenty-four months, and then she has just one year
of supervised release. For some crimes that length of time is too
short.
It occurs to me that I have told you what the guidelines have
failed to do and where they do not bother us. I should also tell you
what the guidelines have successfully accomplished. The guide-
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lines give the inmate a predictable sentence. They do in fact reduce the disparity. They do result in the least restrictive sentence.
The guidelines achieve this principally by defining what the appropriate factors are for us to take into account, and they remind us
that economic background, sex, and race are not appropriate factors. If you are going to deviate you must think through those factors; you have to identify for yourself, the inmate, and the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission why you will depart.
I had a case recently that really brought that home. The defendant was charged with a major economic offense. He previously committed eleven similar crimes. He always involved
women in his crimes. They were not victims in the sense that they
were victims in a crime. But they lived with him, they loaned him
money, they loaned him their cars, they slept with him, and they
let him use their checkbooks. For that reason I wanted to deviate
a lot. The guidelines forced me to look carefully at the circumstance of the crime, and I realized I could not punish him because
of his treatment of women.
This was, however, a major economic offense and many victims, in addition to these nice young women, were involved. The
guidelines made me think through it. I deviated and I deviated for
appropriate reasons. I went home knowing I did not deviate on
the basis of prejudice.
Finally, the guidelines return to the judiciary the right to impose the sentence. In the past I could sit there and really look
tough and say, "You do twenty years in the state prison," and then
two and a half years later the offender was out on the street. Now
when I sentence I have seen the victim, and I have the offense
fresh in my mind. If I decide to deviate and if I say fifteen years,
the person will serve ten years. Especially in sex crimes, and here
another one of my prejudices comes out, the parole board would
base the release of sex offenders on their behavior in the prison.
Well, these were men who like to assault and victimize women and
beat them up and rape them. There were no women in the prison
and they behaved just beautifully in there. The parole board
would look at the prison behavior of a sex offender and say, "This
is just one fine fellow. He has not beaten up anybody or done anything wrong." They released him and often released him too soon.
Now that power is returned to the judiciary. We do in fact have
control of the sentences.
In closing, I would like to say that you can probably learn to
live with guidelines, and you might even learn to like the
guidelines.
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Appendix
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary
V. Offense Severity Reference Table9
First Degree Murder is excluded from the guidelines by law, and
continues to have a mandatory life sentence.
Adulteration - 609.687, subd. 3(1)
Murder 2 - 609.19(1)

iX1

Murder 2 - 609.19(2)
Murder 3 - 609.195

Assault 1 - 609.221

vii

Criminal Sexual Conduct 1 - 609.342
Kidnapping (w/great bodily harm) - 609.25, subd. 2(2)
Manslaughter 1 - 609.20(1) & (2)
Aggravated Robbery - 609.245
Arson 1 - 609.561

VII

Burglary 1 - 609-582, subd.l(b) & (c)
Criminal Sexual Conduct 2 - 609.343(c), (d), (e), (f) & (h)
Criminal Sexual Conduct 3 - 609.344(c), (d), (g), (h), (i), & (j)
Fleeing Peace Officer (resulting in death) - 609.487, subd. 4(a)
Kidnapping (not in safe place) - 609.25, subd. 2(2)
Manslaughter 1 - 609.20(3)
Manslaughter 2 - 609.205(1)
Arson 2 - 609.562
Assault 2 - 609.222

VI

Burglary 1 - 609.582, subd. 1(a)
Criminal Sexual Conduct 2 - 609.343(a), (b), & (g)
Criminal Sexual Conduct 4 - 609.345(c), (d), (g), (h), (i), & (j)
Escape from Custody - 609.485, subd. 4(4)
Fleeing Peace Officer (great bodily harm) - 609.487, subd. 4(b)
Kidnapping - 609.25, subd. 2(1)
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods (over $2,500) 609.53, subd. 1(a)
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods (all values) 609.53, subd. 3(a)
Receiving Stolen Goods (over $2,500) - 609.525; 609.53
Sale of Hallucinogens or PCP - 152.15, subd. 1(2)
Sale of Heroin - 152.15, subd. 1(1)
Sale of Remaining I & II Narcotics - 152.15, subd. 1(1)
9. Minn. Guidelines, supra note 1, § V.
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Burglary 2 - 609.582, subd. 2(a) & (b)
Criminal Vehicular Operation - 609.21, subd. 1
Criminal Sexual Conduct 3 - 609.344(b), (e), & (f)
Manslaughter 2 - 609.205(2), (3), & (4)
Perjury - 609.48, subd. 4(1)
Possession of Incendiary Device - 299F.79; 299F.80, subd.1,
299F.811; 299F.815; 299F.82, subd.1
Receiving Profit Derived from Prostitution - 609.323, subd. 1
Receiving Stolen Goods ($1000 - $2500) - 609.525; 609.53
Simple Robbery - 609.24
Solicitation of Prostitution - 609.322, subd. 1
Tampering w/Witness - 609.498, subd. 1

IV

Accidents - 169.09, subd.14(a)(1)
Adulteration - 609.687, subd. 3(2)
Assault 3 - 609.223
Bribery - 609.42; 90.41; 609.86
Bring Contraband into State Prison - 243.55
Bring Dangerous Weapon into County Jail - 641.165, subd. 2(b)
Burglary 2 - 609.582, subd.2(c) & (d)
Burglary 3 - 609.582, subd. 3
Criminal Sexual Conduct 4 - 609.345(b), (e), & (f)
False Imprisonment - 609.255, subd. 3
Fleeing Peace Officer (substantial bodily harm) - 609.487,
subd. 4(c)
Malicious Punishment of Child - 609.377
Negligent Fires - 609.576(a)
Perjury - 290.53, subd. 4; 300.61; & 609.48, subd. 4(2)
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods ($150-$2,500) 609.53, subd. 1(a)
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods (over $2,500) 609.53, subd. 2(a)
Receiving Stolen Goods ($301-$999) - 609.525; 609.53
Sale of Cocaine - 152.15, subd. 1(1)
Security Violations (over $2500) - 80A.22, subd. 1; 80B.10, subd. 1;
80C.16, subd. 3(a) & (b)
Tax Evasion - 290.53, subds. 4 & 8
Tax Withheld at Source; Fraud (over $2,500) - 290.92
subd. 25(5) & (12); 290A.11, subd. 2
Terroristic Threats - 609.713, subd. 1
Theft Crimes - Over $2,500 (See Theft Offense List)
Theft from Person - 609.52
Theft of Controlled Substances - 609.52, subd. 3(1)
Use of Drugs to Injure or Facilitate Crime - 609.235
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Accidents - 169.09, subd. 14(a)(2)
Aggravated Forgery (over $2,500) - 609.625
Arson 3 - 609.563
Coercion - 609.27, subd. 1(1)
Coercion (over $2,500) - 609.27, subd. 1(2), (3), (4), & (5)
Criminal Vehicular Operation - 609.21, subd. 2
Damage to Property - 609.595, subd. 1(1)
Dangerous Trespass - 609.60; 609.85(1)
Dangerous Weapons - 609.67, subd. 2; 624.713, subd. 1(b)
Escape from Custody - 609.485, subd. 4(1)
False Imprisonment - 609.255, subd. 2
Negligent Discharge of Explosive - 299F.83
Possession of Burglary Tools - 609.59
Posession of Halluciongens or PCP - 152.15, subd. 2(2)
Possession of Heroin - 152.15, subd. 2(1)
Possession of Remaining Schedule I & II Narcotics - 152.15,
subd. 2(1)
Possession of Shoplifting Gear - 609.521
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods (less than $150)
- 609.53, subd. 1(a)
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods ($150-$2,500) 609.53, subd. 2(a)
Prostitution (Patron) - 609.324, subd. 1
Receiving Profit Derived from Prostitution - 609.323, subd. 2
Sale of Remaining Schedule I, II, & III Non-narcotics - 152.15,
subd. 1(2)
Security Violations (under $2500) - 80A.22, subd. 1; 80B.10, subd.
1; 80C.16, subd. 3(a) & (b)
Solicitation of Prostitution - 609.322, subd. 2
Tax Withheld at Source; Fraud ($301-$2,500) - 290.92, subd. 25(5)
& (12); 290A.11, subd. 2
Tear Gas & Tear Gas Compounds - 624.731, subd. 3(b)
Theft Crimes - $250-$2,500 (See Theft Offense List)
Theft of Controlled Substances - 609.52, subd. 3(2)
Theft of a Firearm - 609.52, subd. 3(3) (e)
Theft of Public Records - 609.52
Theft Related Crimes - Over $2,500 (See Theft Related Offense
List)
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Accidents - 169.09, subd. 14(b)(1)
Aggravated Forgery ($250-$2,500) - 609.625
Aggravated Forgery (misc) (non-check) - 609.625; 609.635; 609.64
Coercion ($300-$2,500) - 609.27, subd. 1(2), (3), (4), & (5)
Damage to Property - 609.595, subd.1(2) & (3)
Negligent Fires (damage greater than $10,000) - 609.576(b)(3)
Precious Metal Dealers, Receiving Stolen Goods (less than $150)
- 609.53, subd. 2(a)
Precious Metal Dealers, Regulatory Provisions - 325F.73
Riot - 609.71
Sale of Marijuana/Hashish/Tetrahydrocannabinols - 152.15,
subd. 1(2)
Sale of a Schedule IV Substance - 152.15, subd. 1(3)
Terroristic Threats - 609.713, subd. 2
Theft-Looting - 609.52
Theft Related Crimes - $250-$2,500 (See Theft Related Offense
List)
Accidents - 169.09, subd. 14(b)(2)(3)
Assault 4 - 609.2231
Aggravated Forgery (Less than $250) - 609.625
Aiding Offender to Avoid Arrest - 609.495
Depriving Another of Custodial or Parental Rights - 609.26
Forgery - 609.63; and Forgery Related Crimes (See Forgery
Related Offense List)
Fraudulent Procurement of a Controlled Substance - 152.15,
subd. 3
Leaving State to Evade Establishment of Paternity - 609.31
Nonsupport of Wife or Child - 609.375, subds. 2, 3, & 4
Possession of Cocaine - 152.15, subd. 2(1)
Possession of Marijuana/Hashish/Tetrahydrocannabinols - 152.15,
subd. 2(2)
Possession of Remaining Schedule I, II & III Non-narcotics 152.15, subd. 2(2)
Possession of a Schedule IV Substance - 152.15, subd. 2(3)
Sale of Simulated Controlled Substance - 152.097; 152.15, subd. 2b
Selling Liquor that Causes Injury - 340.70
Solicitation of Prostitution - 609.322, subd. 3
Unauthorized Use of Motor Vehicle - 609.55

